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Abstract
This paper develops a test for Pareto-ef f iciency in the local
public sector which is based on the analytical result that aggregate
property value is maximized at the public output level where the
S.iniuolson condition for efficiency is satisfied. By using cross-section
d.ita, it is possible to deduce whether a representative community
provides its public goods in a property-value-maximizing (and hence
eflicient) fashion. The empirical results show no systematic tendency
til either under- or overprovide public goods in a sample of Massachusetts
comniuni ties.

A Test for Allocative Efficiency in
the Local Public Sector
by
Jan K. Brueckner
The issue of allocative efficiency in the provision of public goods
has been a central concern of theoretical xrork in public finance ever
since the pioneering work of Samuelson (1954). The positive question
cf whether resource allocation in the public sector is in fact efficient
in the real world has, however, received much less attention. In a rare
attenpt to address this question, Barlow (1970) concluded that education
services were overprovided in his sample by using an ingenious argument
which invoked the median voter model and required only a few pieces of
data. The present paper is designed to address the efficiency question
in an entirely new fashion. The paper's empirical test is based on the
recently-discovered result (see Brueckner (1979b, 1980)) that, other
things equal, aggregate property value in a community which levies an
ad valorem property tax is an inverted-U-shaped function of its public
good output, with the maximum occurring at the level where the Samuelson
condition for Pareto-eff iciency is satisfied. Using this result, it
follows that if aggregate property value in a community is insensitive,
ceteris paribus
, to a marginal change in its public good output, then
the good is a provided at a Pareto-eff ic lent level. The test for effi-
ciency developed below makes use of cross-section regression results
showing the relation between aggregate property values, public expendi-
tures, and other variables for a sample of Massachusetts corrniunities
.
By proper interpretation of these results, the response of aggregate
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property value in a representative community to a change in its public
good output may be inferred, allowing an appraisal of efficiency. The
present test represents an improvement over a related, more complex,
test carried out by Brueckner (1979b), which was based on a regression
equation using median instead of aggregate property value as the depen-
dent variable.
It is important to realize that the intent of this paper is not to
test the Tiebout hypothesis (1956). That hypothesis, which predicts
that consumers will stratify into (necessarily efficient) homogeneous
communities, has been largely discredited in recent theoretical studies
(see, for example, Stiglitz (1977) and Brueckner (1979a)). The follow-
ing analysis implicitly acknowledges this negative verdict on Tiebout
by portraying an economy where communities are realistically heterogene-
ous. The question addressed is whether such communities manage, in
spite of their heterogeneity, to provide public goods efficiently.
Before beginning the analysis, it must be acknowledged that the
present paper owes an obvious debt to Che seminal work of Gates (1969),
who first discovered an empirical relationship between property values
and local public spending (his Interpretation of this discovery was,
hovever, inadequate in light of present knowledge). Also, it should be
noted that theoretical results on the relation between property values
and efficiency derived by Sonstelie and Portney (1978) are similar in
many ways to those which underlie the present study. In the next sec-
tion of the paper, a theoretical model of property value determination
under ad valorem property taxation is developed and the relcticnship be-
tween property values and public outputs is derived. Subsequent
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sections of the paper describe the estimation problen and present the
empirical results and final conclusions.
1. Analysis
The first assumption underlying the analysis is that consumers have
identical tastes. ^"Jhile this requirement is somewhat unrealistic, no
empirical study of the relation between property values and public spend-
ing can proceed without it. Utility is assumed to depend on the consump-
tion of four commodities: housing services (q), two public goods (z^
and 2^), and a numeraire composite commodity (x) • It is assumed that
the common utility function u(e, ,z^,q,x) is strictly quasi-concave. Two
public goods are included in the model for realism; in the empirical
work, the public goods are education and a composite of municipal ser-
vices such as fire and police protection.
A further strong assumption is that utility is uniform across the
system of communities under consideration for the members of each income
group. Letting u denote the utility level achieved by an individual in
equilibrium, this assumption means that u = h(y), v;here y is the indi-
vidual's income and h is some function. Although the equilibrium rela-
tionship between utility and income is not explained with the model, the
assumption h' > (wealthier people reach higher utilities) is natural.
Tniforn utilities require the absence of market frictions: a consumer
i.s free to move to another community or to change his assumption bundle
within a given community if doing so increases his utility.
The first step In the analysis Is to determine house runt as a
function of the public good levels, house size, and the income of the
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occupant. It must be stressed that the analysis does not explore the
consumer's choice of q and x for given public consumption levels. In-
stead, the argument proceeds in reverse by asking what the rent on a
house must be in order for its occupant to enjoy the utility level which
he is assumed to reach in equilibrium. Since utility must equal h(y),
It follows that the equilibrium consumption bundle for a consumer with
income y must satisfy
h(y) = uCz^.z^.q.x) (1)
Inverting this equation yields
X = u(z^,Z2,q,h(y)) ^ t(z^,22,q;y), (2)
which gives the amount of x required to generate utility h(y) for an in-
dividual with specified housing and public good consumption levels.
Letting R denote house rent, it follows that for the individual to be
able to purchase the amount of x given by (2), the relation
y - R - t(2^,Z2,q;y) (3)
cust hold. Rearrangement yields the consumer "bid-rent" function, v/hich
relates rent to public consumption levels, house size, and income:
R(z^,Z2,q;y) = y - t(z^,Z2,q;y). (A)
It fellows from (1) and (3) that R^ = u, /u , > 0, R =
"o/^a ^ °»
R_ = u„/u, > 0, and R, = l-h'/u, < (subscripts indicate partial deriv-
atives). The positive signs of R^
,
R^, and R result frc:n the fact that
a higher z , z«, or q requires a lower x and hence higher rent to keep
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utility constant (utility is constant since y is fixed). The sigh of R
is indeterminate because of two opposing effects. First, holding z, , z^
and q fixed, the increase in utility which accompanies an increase in
income requires an increase in x. Therefore rent, which is the differ-
ence between y and x, can either increase or decrease since y itself in-
creases. Finally, it is easy to show that the strict quasi-concavity of
tlie utility function u means that R is a strictly concave function of
2^, z^, and q.
It is important to realize that a normal consumer choice process
occurs behind the scenes in the present model; consumers choose housing
a..c X consumption to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint in
standard fashion. Thus, although (A) gives the rent consistent with a
consumer's equilibrium utility level in houses of all sizes, the rental
pa>Tnent actually made by the consumer (for given z and z ) is found by
substituting in (4) his chosen value of q. Now since this value will
depend on z
, z, , and y (we would expect q to increase with y), it fol-
lows that the arguments of R cannot be viewed as independent of one an-
other. The crucial observation, however, is that regardless of the ex-
tent of correlation am.ong z , z^, q, and y, house rent must be related
:o these variables in the manner described by (4).
The next important assumption is that tax revenue is raised en-
tirely by ad valorem property taxation using separate property tax rates
• and -^ for the tv;o public goods. This assumption is faithful to re-
ality for the chosen sample since Massachusetts communities levy no
sales or income taxes. Nov the value (or sailing price) of a rental
property equals the present discounted value of the excess of rent over
the property tax liability. Letting v represent value, it follows that
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V V^. (5)
2
where 6 is the discount rate. Rearrangement gives the value of a
house as a function of z^ , z„, q, y, and the property tax rates:
R(z, ,z„,q;y)
V ^r-i • (^)
Using (6), the aggregate value of rental property in a community may be
written
i;R(z,,2 ,q ;y )
=—=—=—i— (7)
Although the discussion so far applies to rental houses, the same
results hold with owner-occupied dwellings. This follov/s because in
equilibrium, an owner-occupier must be indifferent between owning and
renting his house. Indifference requires that the present discounted
value of rental payments R/e equals the purchase price of the house v
plus the present discounted value of property tax payments (t +t )v/9.
This equality reduces to (5), implying that (7) is appropriate regard-
3less of the renter-owner-occupier composition of the coirmunity.
A variant of the preceding discussion applies to business property.
Suppose first that production uses labor as well as structure and non-
structure capital but that the public goods z, and z^ do not enter firm
production functions. For a given structure input s, firms (which are
assun.ed to be identical) will maximize profit gross of rent, with the
maximized value TT(s,g) depending on the structure input and the wage
rate g (the price of non-structure capital (machines and intermediate
goods) will be uniform across communities). Since business rents will

be bid up to eliminate profits, the rent for a business structure of
size s in a community with wage rate g must equal Tr(s,g). The value of
a business structure is consequently w(s,g)/ (e-l-T^+T„) , with aggregate
business property value in a conmunity being given by
2tt(s
,g)
e+T^+T^ - e+T^-fT^ (8)
Using (7) and (8), aggregate business and residential property value
may be written
W(z.,z„,Q;Y) + n
where the function W represents ZR(z, ,z„,q
. ;y ) from (7) (0 and Y are
the vectors of the q. and y. respectively).
The property tax system must raise revenue sufficient to finance
that part of a community's public expenditures not supported by inter-
governmental aid. Letting G denote the intergovernmental revenue re-
ceived, by the community to help finance provision of public good i, bud-
get balance for the local government requires
-, (w+n)
+ G. = C^(z, ,n) (10)
e+T^+T^ 1 '1
-2(w-n)
^TTTT+G = C'Cz^.n). (11)1^2
where the C are the cost functions for public production. The appear-
ance of community population n in these functions reflects public good
congestion; C„ = is appropriate if z is a pure public coed, while
C^ > G would held in the presence of congestion. Note that the first
terms in (10) and (11) represent the revenue generated by the two prop-
erty ta:< levies.
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Equations (10) and (11) constitute a two-equation system which de-
tennines t^ and t„ as functions of z , z„, Q, Y, n, G , and G^ (n is
implicit in the dimension of the vectors Q and Y) . Substitution in (9)
reduces aggregate property value to an expression which depends only on
the above variables:
P = ?{z^,z^,Q,Y,B,G^,G^). (12)
By using (10) to evaluate the partial derivatives of x and t„ with re-
spect to the given variables, the partial derivatives of P in (12) may
be computed. Lengthy but straightforward calculations yield
3P 1 W-n r^^l . ^^2
^"
^-^^l-*-^2 (e^^+T^)' ^" '"
a? w-n r^i . °'2, 1
(^+^) =i> (13)
[^+^) =i^ 0. i = 1.23G, ,,. . ^2 ^3G 3G/ 6i (e+Tj^+T^) i i
3t, 3t,
(lA)
ap
_
aw/?Q WJL^ f—1 + —ll = i iH n n^^
3Q e+T^+T2
^Q^^ +T )2 ^9Q
^ 3Q J - e 3Q " "• ^^->
(.Nctu that 3P/3C is a vector with representative element iP/3q =
Q/-) (oVr/Sq^^) = (1/6) ^3(2,,z ,q ;y ).) Nov the partial derivatives
of the T with respect to E, Q and the G. are all negative due to the
reduction in ta:-: effort which is possible in a comcunity with large
houses, substantial business property, or generous intergovernmental
aid. An increase in Q or " therefore causes a direct increase in ag-
jre'^r.te value via an increase aggregate rent together '.-rith an indirect
Increase due to lower tax rates, leading to the positive expressions in

-9-
(13) and (15), While an increase in G has no direct effect on rent,
the indirect effect which operates through lower tax rates increases ag-
gregate value.
Although an increase in IT could reflect an increase in either the
size or number of business properties, the derivative oP/3Q implicitly
holds the number of residential dwellings fixed. Finding the effect on
value of an increase in the size of the housing stock requires further
analysis. First, it is easy to see that if z^ and z„ are pure public
1 _ 2
goods (C = C =0), then any increase in the housing stock (an in-
crease in the dimension of the vectors Q and Y, with arbitrary q and y
values added) permits lower tax rates. Thus the positive direct effect
of a larger housing stock on aggregate value is reinforced by a positive
Indirect effect due to lower tax rates, and value increases. On the
other hand, if the public goods are congested then higher expenditures
are needed to hold the z fixed as n increases, and the directions of
the required budget-balancing tax rate changes are uncertain, leading
to an indeterminate change in aggregate value. Brueckner (1981) re-
cently provided evidence that the congestion properties of municipal
fire protection are close to those of a pure public good. To the extent
that this property is shared by other public goods, a larger housing
stock will mean higher aggregate property value.
The effect of an increase in income on aggregate property value
holding the housing stock and other variables fixed is similarly ambig-
uous. This indeterminacy is a result of the ambiguous sign of the par-
tial derivative cf R v/ith respect to y, which cakes the influence of y
on aggregate rent and on the property tax rates impossible to evaluate
(see above)
.
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The nature of the relationship between aggregate property value and
the levels of the public goods z^ and z„ provides the basis of the test
for allocative efficiency developed below. Calculations similar to
those underlying (13)-(15) yield
ap '""'H v+n ''^ ''
*-32„ 3zJ e'-32„ ^1^9z^
^-^1+^2 (e+T^+t2>^ ' ""' " ""'
. f(zR^(z^.z2.qi;yi)-cJ] (i6)
1, "i^^l'^Z'^^i'^'i^ «,
^ I , ^ \ - c.l, £ = 1,:
e>- u (z ,z ,q ,x ) 1-"
where the last eqviality follows fron the definition of the function R
(see above). Equation (16) establishes that 3P/3z^ and 3P/3z^ both
equal zero when z. and z„ assume values such that for each public good,
the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between that good and the
nuceraire equals the good's marginal cost (that is, where both Sarauelson
conditions hold). Moreover, it is easy to show that as long as the pub-
£
lie goods are produced with constant or decreasing returns (C^ ^ >^ 0,
'=1,2), aggregate property value is a strictly concave function of z.
and z^. The concavity of P means that, holding the stocV: of structures
and consumer income (and hence utility) levels fixed, aggregate property
value reaches a global maximum at values of z and z^ where the
Sa-uelson conditions hold. This iniportant result provides the founda-
tion for the subsequent empirical work.
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By imposing more structure on consumer tastes, it becomes possible
to deduce whether the public goods exceed or fall short of their (cete-
ris paribus ) property-value-maximizing levels simply by examining the
signs of 3P/3z , £-1,2. This greatly simplifies interpretation of later
empirical results. It is necessary to assume that the utility function
is additively separable in z^ and 2„, so that
u(2 ,z ,q,x) = ({)(z ,q,x) + yCz-.q.x). In this case, the ^!RS between 2^
and X is independent of z„ and the MRS between z and x is independent
of z
,
with the result that 'iVl'hz in (16) depends only on z^, £=1,2.
This in turn means that z„ is {^^ erproy
e
^ relative to the property-
l overprovided
value-maximizing level as 3P/9z < 0, i. = 1,2. Without separability of
tastes, this useful conclusion need not follow.
Suppose that the equalities 3P/3z^ = dF/dz^ " are satisfied for
a given community. In other word^, suppose that holding the stocks of
residential and business structures, intergovernmental aid levels, and
consumer income (and utility) levels fixed, a marginal increase in the
level of either public good would leave aggregate property value un-
changed, implying that aggregate value is maximal. Although (16) shows
that the local stationarity of aggregate value necessary for a maximum
requires satisfaction of the familiar Samuelson conditions, it is impor-
tant to know precisely what efficiency implications stationarity holds.
The issue is, unfortunately, not entirely straightforv/ard due to the ex-
istence of an ad valorem property tax. As £ho^.7n in Brueckner (1980)
using a model without business property, such a tax will distort con-
sumer choice between housing and the nunercire x, leading to an equilib-
rium in which the housing stock must be viewed as non-optimal. As a
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result, satisfaction of the Samuelson conditions yields only a second-
best conclusion in a model with II = 0: under ad valorem property taxa-
tion, satisfaction of these conditions implies that resource allocation
within the community is Pareto-efficient conditional on the non-optimal
housing stock (see Brueckner (1980)). Thus, when aggregate property
value is locally stationary (and hence maximal) with respect to varia-
tion in z and z„ in the present model, it follows that holding the
stock of residential and business structures fixed, no rearrangement of
(nonstructure) community resources can lead to a Pareto-superior alloca-
8
I ton.
New it is important to realize that varying z^ and z„ while holding
Q,Y,n, and the G. fixed is a purely conceptual exercise. Since the
variables determining aggregate value are highly interdependent, an al-
teration in z or z^ holding the remaining variables fixed does not rep-
resent a conceivable real-world change. The goal of the empirical work,
however, is to deduce the ceteris paribus effects on aggregate value of
charges in the z. by using data from a cross-section of communities.
Tr.e feasibility of such an approach, whose ultimate goal is to reach an
efficiency verdict for communities in the sample, is ir^de clear in the
ne::t section.
2. The Estin-^tion Problem
Sample observations for the variables P, z , z
, Q, Y, n, G , and
G will lie somewhere on or near the aggregate property value hyper-
surface defined by (12) (a random error term will account for some scat-
ter around the hypersurface) . The goal of the empirical work is to
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extract Information from this point scatter concerning public sector ef-
ficiency in the sample. To see how this is possible, consider for a mo-
inent an unrealistic situation in which a single public good z is pro-
vided at different levels in a cross-section of communities with
identical values of Q, Y, II, and G (note that G^ and G^ have become one
variable). In this case, aggregate property value is a simple single-
peaked function of z, as shown in Figure 1. Suppose further that as
shewn in the Figure, all sample observaticns lie to the left of the peak
(.that is, dP/3z > holds in each community). This means tliat the pub-
lic fcod outputs In the sample are inefficient in the conditional sense
of Section 1 (holding a community's stock of structures fi>-.ed, a higher
public good output would permit a Pareto-superior allocation). Now in
tl.f situation shown in the Figure, it is clear that a regression line
fitted to the data will exhibit a positive slope. Similarly, if all ob-
servations lie to the right of the peak (public goods are overprovided
relative to the common (conditionally) efficient level) , then the re-
gression line will have a negative slope, while if observations are
clustered near the peak of the curve, then the slope will be near zero.
V.'hfc-n communities realistically have different values of Q, Y, IT, and C,
Flnilar conclusions emerge: if communities uniformly satisfy 8P/3z — 0,
[positive
then a regression hyperplane fitted to the data will e>;hibit a
^
zero
z-coef f icient. Sim.ilarly, when two public goods are provided,
{positive
zero
negative
z .-ccef f icier.t for a regression plane, i = 1,2. If one is v/illing to
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believe that coicmunities share a common efficiency bias in providing
public goods (uniformly underproviding or overproviding them relative
to the (community-specific) levels where 3P/8z = 0), then the preceding
discussion makes interpreting property value regression results espe-
cially easy. In the one-public-good case, a { . } z-coef f icient^ r e.
» negative
will indicate a common bias toward { . . } of the good, while
overprovision
a zero coefficient will indicate a tendency toward efficient provision.
Similar conclusions hold in the case of two public goods when it is re-
called that separability of tastes allows the direction of inefficiency
for good 2 to be evaluated simply by noting the sign of 3P/32 , i = 1,2.
With separable tastes, a {P°^ ^. } z.-coeff icient will indicate a com-
negative i
men bias toward { . . } of good z
.
, i = 1,2, while a zero co-
overprovision ^ V '
efficient will indicate a tendency toward efficient provision of the
good.
The preceding argument shows that when communities exhibit a common
efficiency bias, the direction of inefficiency in the sample may be
evaluated by simply noting the signs of the z -coefficients of a regres-
sion plane fitted to the data. Without a common bias, however, inter-
pretation of regression results is more difficult. For example, if some
communities substantially underprovide while others substantially over-
provide public goods, then in the simple case of Figure 1, data points
will be clustered in two widely-separated groups on either side of the
peak of the curve and a regression line may show a slope close to zero.
In this case, -a zero slope indicates a diversity of public good levels
rather than a tendency toward efficiency. This type of ambiguity, how-
ever, does not prohibit the extraction of Important Information from
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"regresslon results. Since a positive z -coefficient is inconsistent
with uniform overprovision of good z in the sample, while a negative
coefficient is inconsistent with uniform underprovision, it follows that
a
^negative^ z.-coefficient is evidence against a systematic tendency
roverprovide , , _ ,
, ^
underprovide^ ^ ^i' example, a positive z^-coeff icient jus-
tifies the statement "not all communities in the sample are overprovid-
ing 2, •" VJhile this statement is weaker than the conclusion that z^ is
uniformly underprovided, it does not rely on the strong assumption of a
common efficiency bias among communities. Finally, a zero z,-
coefficient is evidence that there is no systematic tendency to under-
provide ££ overprovide good z . It is, of course, not possible to tell
in this case whether public good levels are approximately efficient in
the sample or whether (as in the above example) communities choose
grossly inefficient outputs.
The next section of the paper describes the estimation procedure
and the data and interprets the empirical results in light of the pre-
ceding discussion.
3. Estimation Technique, Data, and Empirical Results
In fitting a regression plane to the data, the fact that the aggre-
gate property value relationship (12) forms part of a simultaneous equa-
tion system was taken into account. First, as discussed above, the fea-
tures of a community's housing stock will depend on the income levels
of its residents as well as on features of the economic environment such
as the levels of z. and z„. Moreover, since a community's public good
outputs represent the outcome of a political process which aggregates
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In some way the desires of its residents, z^ and z„ must themselves be
viewed as functions of income levels, other socioeconomic variables, and
variables such as n, G^ , and G which determine the tax effort required
to support given expenditure levels. In addition, since intergovernmen-
tal aid of various types is determined in the sample by a number of com-
plicated formulas involving local spending levels, incomes, and even ag-
gregate property values (the latter applies in the case of state aid to
education) , it follows that G and G must be viewed as functions of
1 ^
other variables in the model.
Now as is well-known, the right-hand variables in an equation which
J.O part of a simultaneous system will be correlated with the error term.
In the present context, this means that the direction of sample devia-
tions away from the hypersurface (12) will be sensitive on average to
the values of the right-hand variables. In a standard simultaneous
equations setting, this kind of correlation leads to inconsistent OLS
estimates of structural parameters. As the discussion in Section 2
makes clear, however, the goal of the present empirical work is not to
estimate the parameters of a structural equation. Rather, the empirical
procedure is meant to indicate where on the hypersurface corresponding
to the structural equation (12) the sample observations lie. Neverthe-
less, it is clear that correlation between the right-hand variables in
(12) and the error term will distort the relationship between the point
scatter and the underlying hypersurface, introducing a possible source
of error into the procedure described in Section 2. To eliminate this
correlation problem, two-stage least squares was used in fitting a re-
gression plane to the data. The levels of the public goods and
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intergovernmental aid as well as conmunity housing characteristics were
viewed as endogenous variables, while incomes, community size, and busi-
ness profit gross of rent (which was viewed as closely related to local
business employment) were taken to be exogenous.
As a result of the notorious unreliability of previous data on ag-
gregate property values in Massachusetts communities, the state govern-
ment completed in 1976 a costly, ambitious project designed to facili-
tate accurate measurement of aggregate values and thus increase the
fairness of the distribution of state aid to education, which is tied
in Massachusetts (as elsewhere) to the size of community tax bases.
The resulting 1976 aggregate property value ("equalized value") measure
is the dependent variable for the regressions. To represent the income
vector Y, the scalar variable equal to community median income for 1970
(denoted YMED) was used (an income measure for a year closer to 1976
was not available) . The search for variables measuring housing stock
characteristics ranged over six possibilities: the percentage of 1970
housing units which had at least three bedrooms, had more than one bath-
room, lacked some or all plumbing facilities, were in one-unit struc-
tures, or were built after 1960, and the median number of rooms in all
housing units. Since only the second of these variables (denoted BATHS)
performed as anticipated, it is the sole housing characteristics vari-
able included in the regressions. As a measure of the size of the hous-
ing stock, the number of housing units in the community in 1970 (denoted
HUIIITS) was used (a more current housing stock proxy, 1975 community
population, performed in an essentially identical fashion). At first,
total retail, wholesale, service, and manufacturing employment
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represented IT, business profit gross of rent. High correlation between
HUNITS and total employment in the three non-manufacturing categories
led to their deletion, however, with manufacturing employment (MFGEMP)
remaining in the equation. As a result, the sizes of the stocks of res-
idential and commercial structures are represented simultaneously by the
variable HUNITS, with MFGEMP representing the stock of manufacturing
structures. Although the model was developed with two intergovernmental
aid variables, G and G^, it was felt that the regression procedure
V(Ould net allow the untangling of separate aid effects. Consequently,
a single aid variable, total intergovernmental revenue received by the
community in 1976 (IGREV) , appeared in the regressions. Although the
model was developed without considering the effect of accessibility to
empio\Tiient on property values, a dummy variable representing community
locflticn was included in the regressions. The variable (LOCD) , which
aGsumta the value of zero for Boston and its seven innermost suburbs
and equals unity otherwise, should exhibit a negative coefficient due
to tne positive relationship between accessibility and property values
prcdii.ted by urban spatial analysis.
The greatest virtue of the Massachusetts sample is that school dis-
tricts in the state are coterminous with municipalities and townships,
guarar.Lct-ing that consumption of education and other nunlcipal services
is Lr.iform within city boundaries. Almost everywhere else in the U.S.,
muri'.ipal and school district boundaries bear no systematic relationship
tc one another, making it exceptionally difficult to deduce the public
9
spending levels relevant to any given area. The public good levels z^
and z^ were represented by 1976 community education expenditures (EDEX)
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I
and non-education municipal expenditures (MUEX) . Both variables were
computed net of capital outlays and reflect subtraction of charges for
school lunches in the case of education and charges for sewage, hospital,
and other services in the case of municipal expenditures (charges are
levied for services not supported by property taxation)
.
In the TSLS estimation procedure, the variables BATHS, IGREV, EDEX,
and MUEX were taken to be endogenous, while YIIED, HUNITS, MFGEMP, and
LOCD were treated as exogenous. Other exogenous variables not in the
equation but appearing in the reduced form were 1970 values for the per-
cent of community residents with at least a high school education, the
percent of families with children under six years of age, the percent
of employed residents with white collar jobs, the percent of community
housing units owner-occupied, the percent of units built since 1960 (a
measure of the newness of the community) , and a dummy variable which
assumes the value one for a rural township and zero otherwise. Together
with the included exogenous variables, these variables explain nearly
all of the variance in the endogenous variables (reduced-form results
are not reported).
The sample consisted of 54 communities in Massachusetts with school
districts enrolling at least 5000 pupils in 1976. Fourteen communities
with enrollments exceeding 5000 were not included in the sample because
of non-negligible 197u payments (in all cases in excess of 3% of educa-
tion expenditures) to regional school systems for services such as sec-
ondary or vocational education (a number of regional school districts
exist in Massachusetts to provide specialized services to SF.all local
districts). A list of communities in the sample is found in the ap-
pendix.
..i'!'i'«> — ^»^,--'--.'--.'VS'.;-!-'^»4V.*HA*'n"''i.
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The first line of Table 1 shows Che TSLS regression results using
EDEX, MUEX, HUNITS, BATKS, MFGEMP, YMED, IGREV, and LOCD as right-hand
variables. Note that the estimated coefficient of BATHS is signifi-
cantly positive, indicating that other things equal, a higher proportion
of large houses (houses with more than one bathroom) leads to higher
aggregate property value. Similarly, the significantly positive
coefficient of HUNITS indicates that a larger number of housing units
(ard thus a larger stock of commercial structures) leads, other things
equul , to higher aggregate value. The coefficient of bJFCENP is positive
but insignificant, showing that the effect of manufacturing structures
on aggregate value is too weak to manifest itself in the regressions.
The coefficient of the location dummy LOCD has the anticipated negative
sign, although the location effect on aggregate value is apparently not
strong enough to yield an estimate significantly different from zero.
YMED's coefficient is significantly negative, indicating that, other
things equal, higher incomes reduce property values. Recall th^t the
analysis yielded no definite sign prediction for this coefficient.
Ivliile insignificant, the estimated coefficient of IGREV is negative and
h;^s a relatively large absolute t-ratio, in apparent violation of the
model. The only immediate explanation for this anomaly is that the re-
gressicn is picking up the negative relationship between state aid to
education and aggregate (equalized) property value which follows from
the state aid formula. In other words, the negative association between
tle5,e variables implied by another structural equation in the system
(the did fonuula) is strong enough to uask, in spite of the use of TSLS,
the positive relationship anticipated for the giver structural equation.
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The most important regression results, of course, are the estimated
coefficients of EDEX and MUEX, neither of which is significantly differ-
ent from zero. Recalling the discussion in Section 2, these facts jus-
tify the important conclusion that neither public good is systematically
over- or underprovided in the Massachusetts sample. Under the supposi-
tion that communities share a common efficiency bias, the results carry
the stronger implication that local public outputs in Massachusetts ex-
hibit a tendency toward efficiency. The second line of Table 1 shows
that similar conclusions emerge when communities are viewed as providing
one public good instead of two. l-Jhen public expenditure is represented
by the single variable EX = EDEX + MUEX, little change occurs in the
sign and significance of the other estimated coefficients (one encourag-
ing change is the substantial increase in MFGEMP's t-ratio) . Moreover,
ex's insignificant coefficient justifies the same efficiency conclusions
reached above: there is no evidence of a tendency toward systematic
ever- or underprovision of a composite public good; evidence exists of
a tendency toward efficiency under the assumption of a common efficiency
bias.
It is interesting to note that using regression results based on
median instead of aggregate property value, Brueckner (1979b) con-
structed a complex argument leading to the conclusion that public goods
in the well-known Dates (1969) sample are overprovided. This conclusion
relied en the assumption of a common efficiency bias.
4. Conclusion
The results in this paper show that Massachusetts communities ex-
hibit no systematic tendency to over- or undcrprovide public goods.
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This means that a representative community is as likely to provide each
public good above the level which is Pareto-ef f icient conditional on Its
stock of structures as it is to provide it below the conditionally effi-
cient level. If the strong assumption that communities share a common
efficiency bias is satisfied, the results justify the stronger conclu-
sion that the local public sector in Massachusetts exhibits a tendency
tov/ard conditional Pareto-eff iciency. l^ile similarity of governmental
structures among communities in the sample suggests that a common effi-
citncy bias may well e:-:ist, the assumption unfortunately remains in the
realm of conjecture.
Although the above empirical results are informative and interest-
^r.g, the paper's most important contribution is its demonstration that
tlie public sector efficiency question can be addressed empirically using
a unified, rigorous framework built on relatively weak assumptions. The
other major efficiency study by Barlov; (1970) does not share the latter
ft-ature since it invokes the median voter model and imposes strong as-
sumptions on functional forms.
As a final observation, it should be realized that the passage in
IbSC of Proposition 2 1/2, whose intent was to slash property tax levies
in Massachusetts, appears puzzling in light of tl^e present evidence.
Appr.rertly, a substantial majority of Massachusetts taxpayers desired a
reduction in local public spending, suggesting that public outputs v/ere
gtr.cr. lly above Pareto-ef f icient levels. Of course, voters may have
subscribed to the common "tax revolt" notion that reduced government
waste would allow maintenance of public consumption levels in the face
of smaller budgets. To the extent that tliis notion was widely lield,
tb.e passage of Proposition 2 1/2 is not inconsistent with this paper's
empirical conclusions.
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Footnotes
Although no attempt is made to describe the political process by
which public good levels are set, it is natural that z and z would
increase with the income level of the community. This is a further
reason to anticipate strong positive correlation among the arguments
of R.
2
The formulation (5) implicitly assumes that houses have infinite
lives. Incorporating the effect on value of differences in remaining
lifespans among houses would introduce severe complications.
3
This discussion obviously ignores the different tax treatment
of owner-occupiers and renters.
4
When firms are realistically different from one another, the
function tt must be indexed by firm type. Now for a firm of type j
to occupy a given structure of size s, it must be the case that
'^(Sig) " maxfu (s,g), i=l m}, where m is the number of firm
f(s )
types. Aggregate business property value becomes Iti -' (s ,g)/(6+T^+T_),
where f (s.) equals the index of the firm type with the highest value
of TT for given structure. Since the subsequent analysis uses aggregate
business profit gross of rent (II) directly as an independent variable,
the exact form of the expression which yields II turns out to be un-
important. Thus, whether (8) or the more complex expression above is
appropriate for determining aggregate value is immaterial for the pur-
poses of the analysis. In addition, note that the local wage variable
g, which will be related to the values of the y , is submerged in the
variable n.
Since z^ and z_ are represented by education and other municipal -
services in the empirical work, the assumption of independent cost
functions is realistic. For other pairs of public goods (fire and
police protection, for example), the cost of providing a given amount
of one public good could depend on the level of provision of the other.
Note that the x. in the last line of (16) are not held fixed as
2- and z„ vary but adjust according to the function t in (2) to keep
utilities constant.
Recalling that R is a strictly concave function of z^ and 2„, it
follows that ZR (z ,z^,q.;y ) < 0, which together with C >_ implies
2 2 ""
3 P/^Zj, "^ 0, £ = 1,2. Since concavity of R means that T.^(') is also
2
strictly concave in z. and z,, it follows that ER^ ER„ - (ER„^) > 0,
which implies that (dh/dz'^) {'ah/dz'^^) - {^'^Vl^z^^z^y =
ZR^^IR22 - C^R2i)2 - CI^IR^^ - C^^ZR,^ + C^^C^^ > 0.

Q
Although the analysis of Brueckner (1980) relates to a model
where the only private production activity is housing production (so
that a stock of business structures does not exist), an extension of
the paper's argioment would cover the case where each comrounity has
both business and residential structures. It also should be noted
that satisfaction of the Samuelson condition within each coiimunity
does not necessarily mean that the overall equilibrium of the com-
munity system is efficient (see Brueckner (1980)).
9
A potential criticism of the Massachusetts sample is that com-
munities are not all located in the same metropolitan area, making
the assumption of uniform utilities within each income group difficult
to accept. A response to this criticism is that the physica] size of
the state of Massachusetts is small enough so that the informational
preconditions for arbitrage leading to uniform utilities are present.
This argument ignores, however, possible short-run frictions due to
job iiTimobility among metropolitan areas, an impediment to mobility
v^ich does not arise when all employment is in the central city of
one metropolitan area and selection of a community simply involves
a choice of residential location.
The change from public gocd levels to expenditures requires
1 2inverting the relationships E^ = C (z ,n) and E^ = C (z„,n) (the E.
are expenditures) to yield z = C (E ,n), i = 1,2. Equation (12) then
becomes
P = P(C^(E^,n). C^(E2,n), Q, Y, n, G^, G^)
= P(E^, E^, Q. Y, n, G^, G^).
New since 3P/3E. = (9P/3z
.) (3C^/3E ) , where 3C^/3E > 0, the signs of
3r/-F. have same efficiency meaning as the signs of 3P/3z. , i = 1,2.
Although the discussion of the effect of the size of the housing stock
(the dimension of Q and Y) on aggregate value changes som.ewhat , it is
easy to see that holding E^ and E_ fixed, an increase in the size of
the stock increases value when the z. are pure public goods but that,
as before, the effect is ambiguous when the z. are congested.
The source for regional district contributions was the 19 70
/'\r.nujl Report of the Department of Education of the Comjnonwealth of
Massachusetts
.

Appendix
Communities In Sample
Agawam**
Andover**
Arlington
Attleboro
Barnstable**
Beverly
Billerica**
Boston*
Brookline*
Burlington
Cambridge*
Chicopee
Dedham
Everett*
Framingham
Franklin
Gloucester
Haverhill
Hingham**
Holyoke
Leominster
Lexington
Lowell
L>-nn
Maiden*
Marlborough
Marshfield**
Medford
Melrose
Natick
Needham
New Bedford
Newton
Peabody
Pittsfield
Quincy
Reading
Revere*
Salem
Saugus
Somerville*
Springfield
Taunton
Tewksbury**
Wakefield
Waltham
Watertown*
West Springfield
West field
Wellesley
Weymouth
Wilmington**
Wobum
Worcester
* - Boston or inner suburb
**
- rural township
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